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Catoptrics, i.e. the optical study of mirrors and the phenomenon of reflection, is the main 
topic of an anonymous late ancient treatise, translated into Latin as De speculis in 1269 by 
William of Moerbeke who (falsely) ascribed it to Ptolemy.1 In the introduction of this rather 
brief treatise, the author states that catoptrics is worth studying as it enables its practitioner to 
construct various kinds of mirrors, including odd ones, such as the one in which the observer’s 
face appears to have three eyes and two noses, and practical ones, such as the one that enables 
the observer to spy on people in the street.2 Such a statement reveals, first, one important feature 
of the entire tradition of premodern optics: it is not a mere detached study of the propagation 
of light and its physical properties but chiefly a complex study of what is visible to a beholder, 
or the whole world of appearances.3 As such, premodern optics is primarily a theory of vision, 
involving—among others—analyses of psychological mechanisms and even what may be 
called a phenomenology of vision (first-person descriptions of visual experiences). Second, it 
testifies to the premodern fascination with mirror images and perceptual ephemera. Whereas 
modern catoptrics is content with the universal law of reflection, ancient and medieval 
catoptrical treatises abound with applications to various kinds of mirrors, including very 
peculiar ones, with the observer’s involvement being crucial in all cases. The question is: what 
appears to them in each mirror and how? 
In the thirteenth century, the assimilation of Greek and Arab optical texts (mainly those by 
Euclid, Ptolemy, Al-Kindí, and Ibn al-Haytham or Alhacen)4 newly translated into Latin goes 
hand in hand with rethinking the optical ideas and theories by scholars well versed in 
Aristotelian philosophy. The inevitable result is that many so far understudied questions 
emerge among the philosophers, such as what is the ontological status of mirror images? And 
what is the place of mirror perception in the broader theory of vision? The present chapter is 
devoted to the former question, so pressing for medieval scholars. Thus, the key questions 
investigated here are: what is or what appears to be in a mirror, or, a little differently, what is 
the perceptual content of a visual experience of an object seen by means of a mirror? 
                                                 
1 On premodern catoptrics (mainly Euclid, Ptolemy, and Alhacen), see, e.g., Smith (2015: 55–72, 92–108, 
195–206). 
2 Pseudo-Ptolemy, De speculis 2, 153–154. 
3 See, e.g., Simon (1987) or Smith (2004). 
4 On these texts, see Smith (2015: 47–64, 76–129, 166–169, 181–227). 
Why is such a question worth exploring? The mirror image, or the scene seen in the mirror, 
evinces a unique combination of properties not found in the images produced by other optical 
devices. The object seen by mirrors appears to be elsewhere than it really is. (Similar 
mislocation is present in photos and pictures but not in the images produced by a magnifying 
glass.) Unlike images by cameras and magnifiers, the mirror images are usually perceived as 
left–right reversed, and, unlike photos (but like images formed by magnifiers), they are not 
persistent—mirrors cannot “freeze” the scene appearing in them and make the image stable 
and fixed.5 
Hence, the mirror image is a peculiar entity that seemingly defies a neat demarcation 
between the mind and the extramental physical world.6 On the one hand, the mirror image 
seems to be endowed with properties that are generally ascribed to ordinary material objects. 
For example, it is localizable, at least to some extent: it is possible to determine how far behind 
the mirror the image appears to be. Also, the image seems public, i.e. perceptually accessible 
to more than one observer; it does not seem to be a private mental entity. However, is there a 
single image appearing in the mirror for every observer? In fact, the image evinces some 
features commonly ascribed to mental entities. For example, it is mind-dependent at least to 
some extent, or rather observer-dependent: its location changes depending on the observer’s 
position; the whole scenery seen in the mirror is reconstituted every time the observer moves. 
Further, the mirror image is perceptible to one sense alone: unlike everyday objects, mirror 
images can be seen but cannot be touched. 
To investigate the metaphysical nature of mirror images, we can begin with a simple 
example of mirror perception. An observer is standing in front of a plane mirror and looking 
into it. She sees her own face, which appears to be behind the surface of the mirror. Now, the 
question is, what does she see in the mirror? Or, to put it ontologically, what kind of entity does 
she encounter? Two possible solutions come immediately to mind: either she sees something 
different from her face, or her own face, albeit in a different place.7 Neither of these solutions 
is self-evident and both comprise some weaknesses. 
The former, which may be called “the multiplication account,” suggests that, besides mirror 
and observer, two different entities are needed for mirror perception: first, the real object and, 
second, its image or reflection constituted by the mirror. However, this account has several 
problems. For one, its proponent must explain what kind of entity the image is. Is it a property 
of the mirror itself? Two, if the mirror image is observer-dependent, what is the exact 
“physical” way by which the observer “causes” the mirror image? Does it mean that the mirror 
itself suffers a change every time somebody looks into it? Further, the mirror image is 
                                                 
5 Physically speaking, there is no reversal in plane mirrors: every point of the object is directly opposite to its 
counterpart in the mirror image. However, from the psychological point of view, the mirror image is 
perceived as reverted since the right-hand person facing the mirror see the left-hand image. Such 
discrepancy, although often debated by contemporary scholars (see, e.g., Takano 1998 for a survey of 
possible explanations), was not problematized in medieval optics, and the latter, observer-involving attitude 
was preferred. See, e.g., Alhacen, De aspectibus VI.3, §3.7, 6, 163–164, 233. 
6 See, e.g., Vendler (1991) who asserts that mirror images, albeit being outside us, are pure epiphenomena of 
the causal processes in our brains, projected outside us. 
7 Such a setting of the problem is inspired by Casati (2012); the labels “multiplication” and “unification” 
account are borrowed from this paper. See also Steenhagen (2017). 
obviously not a stable and fixed entity such as a color painting: it needs to be explained how 
the mirror image changes according to how the observer’s point of view is adjusted every time 
she moves. 
Alternatively, “the unification account” proposes an ontologically more parsimonious 
model of mirror perception—there is only the object seen which causally affects the observer, 
but the causal chain is distorted by the mirror with the consequence that the object of perception 
appears to be outside its proper place. This account also has some problems. For example, it is 
not clear how the real object and its appearance in the mirror can be identical if they are 
distinguishable regarding their position and, as a famous principle states, two entities are really 
identical only if they are mutually indiscernible. Further, there is an epistemic difficulty: the 
unification account seems to imply that every instance of mirror perception is illusory—the 
observer is deceived every time they view the mirror. However, we successfully use mirrors 
for practical purposes on an everyday basis (e.g., when driving a car) and are not deceived by 
them. 
This chapter explores how the issue of mirror perception was treated by medieval 
philosophers. I argue that these two opposite accounts find their medieval expressions in two 
famous figures of the thirteenth and fourteenth century. While the Dominican thinker Albert 
the Great (c. 1200–1280) is introduced as a proponent of a version of the multiplication 
account, the Franciscan Peter Auriol (c. 1280–1322) advocated a version of the unification 
account.8 The main question is what kind of entity they deemed the mirror image to be. The 
consequences and troublesome features of both accounts are considered and the solutions to 
these are collected from their works. Also, the question of how their conceptions of mirror 
perception cohere with their general theories of perception is addressed. 
The Multiplication Account: Albert the Great 
The Dominican thinker Albert the Great, active especially in Paris and Cologne during his long 
and prolific intellectual career,9 devoted a whole question to the issue of mirror images as part 
of his discussion of visual perception, its objects and the nature of colors included in his early 
anthropological work De homine (written in early 1240s).10 The question also circulated as a 
separate treatise under the title De forma resultante in speculo.11 Later, Albert also made 
digressions on mirrors and mirror images in some of his commentaries.12 
The sources at Albert’s disposal offered two opinions on the nature of mirror images. One 
relates to the so-called extramissionist theory of vision. According to such a theory (proposed, 
                                                 
8 It is worth noting that the motive for picking precisely these two thinkers is systematic, rather than historical: 
both present a philosophically interesting and relatively thought-out account of mirror images, regardless of 
whether it was historically influential or not. Also, there is no significant connection between these two 
thinkers, apart from the fact that Albert’s Aristotelian commentaries were commonly studied in the schools 
and Auriol could have become acquainted with them quite easily. 
9 On Albert’s life and works see, e.g., Anzulewicz (1999: I, 4–17). 
10 Albert’s treatise, De visu, is in De homine, 145a–202b; the question on mirror images is on pp. 174a–179a. 
11 The treatise is edited by H. Anzulewicz in Anzulewicz (1999: I, 179–200). 
12 See, e.g., Liber de sex principiis, II.4, Borgnet I, 324b–326a; De sensu et sensato, I.8–10, 35a–45a; see also 
Albert, De anima, II.3.15, 121–122. 
in Albert’s view, by Plato, Empedocles, and Euclid), visual rays issue forth from the eyes, 
reflect from the surface of the mirror and strike the object. The mirror is perceptually grasped 
by the incident ray, the face of the viewer by the reflected ray; as both rays are connected in 
the mirror, the image of the face appears to be there.13 Hence, the mirror image is the object 
itself, incidentally appearing in the mirror. Another position is implied in the so-called 
intromissionist theory of vision which Albert ascribed to Democritus and Aristotle.14 According 
to this theory, vision occurs by the causal influence of the object’s form on the sensory organ. 
Thus, a mirror image must be a form capable of exerting an influence on the observer’s eyes.15 
Considering Albert’s Aristotelian-minded, persistent and long-term criticism of any hint of 
extramission in the visual theory, it becomes obvious that he would favor the latter account of 
the nature of mirror images.16 After all, the very title of his question on mirror images, On the 
Form Reflected in the Mirror, reveals tellingly which account Albert finds attractive. Thus, in 
his view, what is seen in the mirror is an accidental form—an entity like color or light—and, 
strictly speaking, not the material object itself. It is justifiable to read Albert as proposing a 
version of the multiplication account, according to which the mirror image is a more or less 
independent entity. His reasoning is quite simple: if something is able to perform an action, it 
is an actually existent entity—and the form in the mirror is able to act upon the visual power 
and alter the visual organ.17 In other words, the mirror image is causally efficacious, therefore 
it is an entity. Briefly, Albert proposes that mirror images are neither material bodies nor 
substances but accidental forms that are in the mirror as in their subject.18 Again, he presents a 
simple argument: the image is not distant from the mirror; hence, it is in it as in a subject.19 
The initial intuition that what is seen in the mirror is a form of the object is compatible with 
Albert’s understanding of the (external) sensory powers in general. In accordance with 
Aristotle, Albert believes that to each sensory power a proper sensible corresponds so that this 
sensible is not perceived by any other sense—thus, what is colored affects the sight but no other 
sense.20 The external senses are distinguished and defined by their respective proper sensibles. 
Therefore, since to see is nothing else than to apprehend a visible form (color),21 and mirror 
perception is evidently an instance of vision (as it is not clear what else it might be), what is 
                                                 
13 De sensu et sensato, I.6, 29b–30a; on the proponents of extramission, see I.5, 26b–28a. 
14 De sensu et sensato, I.5, 28a–b. 
15 De sensu et sensato, I.10, 43a–44b. 
16 See Anzulewicz (1998: 262–265) or Lička (forthcoming). 
17 Albert, De forma resultante in speculo, 183: “quicquid actu agit aliquid immutando, actu est; forma illa actu 
agit immutando visum; ergo actu est.” 
18 Albert, De forma resultante in speculo, 191, 192. 
19 Albert, De forma resultante in speculo, 184: “unumquodque est in illo ut in subiecto, a quo non distat per 
situm et locum; forma speculi non distat per situm et locum a speculo; ergo est in ipso ut in subiecto.” Note 
that the claim about the image existing in the mirror as in its subject or, in other words, as a form inhering in 
it has several problematic consequences (see below). Albert is aware of (and deals with) them already in De 
forma resultante in speculo. In later works, he abandons the claim itself: the image exists in the mirror not as 
in a subject but only as in a point of reflection (“[imago] est in ipso [speculo] secundum punctum in quo fit 
reflexio”; Liber de sex principiis, II.4, Borgnet, 325b) or as in an instrument “representing by means of 
reflection” (“sicut in representante per reflexionem”; Liber de sex principiis, II.4, Borgnet, 325b, 326a). 
20 De anima, II.3.5, 103a. 
21 Cf. De anima II.3.4, 101b: “omne apprehendere est accipere formam apprehensi.” 
perceived in such a situation cannot be anything other than a form of color. Hence, a mirror 
image is a form existing in the mirror just as a color exists in a colored object. 
Albert’s tentative understanding of mirror images as forms was most likely common among 
his contemporaries, influenced ultimately by the Muslim thinker Al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali 
proposes that to see an object means to have a form of that object impressed in the eye and that 
the impression of the form in the lens of the eye (or in the so-called crystalline humor) is 
analogous to the impression of the form in the mirror. Al-Ghazali even suggests that the mirror 
would see the object by means of the latter’s form it receives—if only it were animated by a 
spiritus.22 
However, such a position, if understood as identifying the mirror image with a form 
impressed in the mirror, has several inconvenient consequences, as discussed above. Three of 
them are worth considering here.23 First, if the mirror image were a real form inhering in the 
mirror, it would really affect the material structure of the mirror: just as the material structures 
of a green leaf and a yellow leaf differ so the matter of the mirror would be altered upon the 
impression of different images. However, such a claim seems counterintuitive, since, e.g., the 
mirror does not acquire a real, permanent color when reflecting a colored object. Second, when 
a color inheres in the surface of an object, it evinces a quantity and stable, measurable 
dimensions. Mirror images also appear to have a sort of width and length. However, if the 
mirror is broken, the mirror image is not divided into parts. On the contrary, a whole image 
appears in every piece of the broken mirror. Hence, it does not seem to inhere in the surface of 
the mirror as a color inheres in the surface of a colored object.24 Third, if the mirror image 
inhered in the mirror as an accident inheres in a subject, it would be “attached” to the mirror 
and would move every time the mirror is moved. However, the opposite is the case: we 
experience that when the mirror moves, the image stays still. On the contrary, the movements 
of the image seem to depend rather on the movements of the reflected object. 
Aware of these problematic consequences, Albert refines his stance with respect to the 
nature of the form in the mirror, its generation and its relation to the mirror. Concerning the 
first problem, he admits that the mirror image is not a full-fledged accidental form inhering in 
the subject in such a way as to affect it. How is that possible? The Aristotelian version of the 
distinction between so-called first and second qualities, introduced by Robert Pasnau in a recent 
paper (2011) may be elucidating here, as it was apparently advocated by Albert, too. Whereas 
many of the common sensible qualities (color, taste, odor, etc.) are second qualities, there are 
also four first qualities (warm, cold, wet, and dry, i.e. the qualities of the four elements: fire, 
water, air, and earth), and second qualities are grounded in the first ones.25 The relation between 
these two kinds of qualities is a relation of supervenience.26 Thus, color, when it is a real quality 
inhering in a subject, is a consequence of the combination of the first qualities of this subject 
                                                 
22 Al-Ghazali, Physica, IV.3.6, 65–66. 
23 Variants of the second and third objection are mentioned by Albert in the context of ways a proponent of 
extramission may argue against an intromissionist theory of vision. See De sensu et sensato, I.6, 30a. 
24 De forma resultante in speculo, 186. 
25 Albert, De generatione et corruptione, II.1.1, Borgnet IV, 417b: “primae qualitates [ … ] causae sunt 
omnium aliarum sensibilium qualitatum [ … ] sunt quatuor qualitates primae, scilicet calidum, humidum, 
frigidum, et siccum.” 
26 Pasnau (2011: 45–46). 
and makes this thing really colored.27 However, the form of color can be abstracted from its 
proper bearer, transmitted through a medium and received in the visual power of a sentient 
being. In this case, the form of color does not meet a corresponding combination of first 
qualities (the material structures of air or eyes are different), and, consequently, it does not 
make its subjects colored but has, as Albert calls it, a mere “spiritual” being in them.28 
Albert also uses this conceptual tool in the issue of mirror images. He insists on the claim 
that a mirror image is a form; however, it is a form with a special kind of being that does not 
alter the material structure of the subject it inheres in. Hence, the nature of the mirror image is 
similar to the way a form of color exists in a medium. It is not a color or image in a strict, full-
fledged sense but rather a species or representation of the color: it contains and transfers 
information about the color, but it does not actually affect its subject and does not make it really 
colored.29 Later, Albert calls this special kind of being “spiritual” and presents a more detailed 
description of the process resulting in an image appearing in the mirror. He notes that light 
(which as such also has spiritual being) has the power to abstract a color or an image from its 
material realization, transfer it and give it a special spiritual kind of being. Since the ray of light 
cannot penetrate the mirror and carry the image through it, it reflects from it, and the image 
remains in the mirror.30 Hence, what the beholder sees in the mirror is an entity different from 
the material object, a form of its color existing in the mirror, not physically (as a color of the 
mirror) but spiritually (as a representation of the object seen). Albeit existing in a diminished 
way, the mirror image is still a color and, hence, has the power to affect the sense of sight. 
Yet, how is the species of color seen in the mirror but not when propagating through the air? 
Albert does not address the issue explicitly; however, he allows that colors are not generated 
only in solid objects (where they follow a certain combination of the first qualities) but also in 
the indeterminate bodies such as clouds, with the rainbow being the most obvious example. 
Briefly, these apparent and unstable colors are brought about by the workings of light (mainly, 
its refraction) when it encounters (optically) denser objects (water drops in the air).31 
Albert may point to an analogous process takes place in the mirror. The glass surface is 
transparent just like air and thus capable of transmitting light and species of colors. However, 
unlike air, the mirror also has a solid lead layer in the back that obstructs the propagation. The 
species of color somehow get stuck in the mirror and become manifest to the eye, with the 
mirror image formation being the result.32 According to Albert, the species also receive some 
of the properties of the subject they are received in. So, as the air is shapeless, the species 
received in it do not take on any determinate shape whereas in the mirror, which is only partially 
                                                 
27 Albert, De homine, 168b: “Color [ … ] secundum quod alterat corpora, videtur generari a primis 
qualitatibus.” 
28 Albert, De homine, 183b: “[Color] non abstrahitur cum causis generantibus ipsum in subiecto, quae sunt 
calidum, frigidum, humidum, siccum [ … ] Sed abstractio fit in propria specie coloris tantum sine omni parte 
materiae et sine omni causa materiali; et hoc est, quod vocat Averroes [ … ] spirituale esse.” 
29 De forma resultante in speculo, 193, 194. 
30 Albert, Liber de sex principiis, II.4, Borgnet I, 324a–b; see also De sensu et sensato, I.10, 43a–b. 
31 De homine, 173b; De meteoris, III.4.14, Borgnet IV, 682b–683b. 
32 De forma resultante in speculo, 195–198. 
transparent and has a determinate shape, the species acquire a determinate figure and appear to 
have proportions.33 
But does the image in the mirror have the proportions it appears to have? This question 
addresses the second problem pertaining to the quantitative properties of mirror images. Again, 
Albert uses a similar strategy. Quantity is a property of a compound of form and matter. Thus, 
dimensions can be attributed to a form only in so far as the form inheres in matter. However, 
the mirror image is not a form in-forming the matter of the mirror—it exists in it as a mere 
species having immaterial being. Therefore, the dimensions it appears to have are only 
properties it represents.34 (Albert also speaks about an “intentional” quantity.35) 
In fact, the image is received not in the whole surface of the mirror but only in one point.36 
The exact position of the point of reception depends on the position of the object represented 
in the mirror image and can be determined by geometrical optics. Albert can also utilize this 
claim to explain the fact that the mirror image sometimes appears to be far behind the surface 
of the mirror, sometimes near to it (a fact often used against a naive impression-theory of mirror 
images).37 He emphasizes that not only the image is represented in the mirror but also, 
somehow, the distance between the observer and the mirror. The depth in which the mirror 
image appears corresponds to the distance between the observer and the mirror.38 Furthermore, 
as the form appearing in the mirror is received in a point and not in the mirror’s whole surface, 
the image is not divided into parts when the mirror is broken. Rather, every piece of the broken 
mirror becomes a new mirror, and the image of the object is received in a point in every of 
these fragments. 
Finally, the third objection to understanding the mirror image as a form concerns the special 
nature of the image’s movements. Being an accident of the mirror, the image ought to move 
dependently on the movements of the mirror; however, its movement depends rather on the 
movements of the object it represents.39 The objection presents a dilemma for a proponent of 
the multiplication account of mirror images: he must deny either the understanding of the image 
as a form in the mirror or the possibility of its movement. Albert deals with the dilemma by 
making concessions to both of its horns. First, he again emphasizes that the image is not a full-
fledged form inhering in the mirror and consequently need not move with the movements of 
the mirror. Second, the image does not move in the strict sense at all. Rather, it is generated 
                                                 
33 De sensu et sensato I.10, 43b. 
34 De forma resultante in speculo, 193: “[Forma in speculo] non proprie est longa vel lata, sed habet speciem 
longitudinis et latitudinis.” 
35 Liber de sex principiis, II.4, Borgnet I, 325b: “Et quantitas imaginis quae apparet, quantitas est intentionalis 
et non quantitas distensa per mensuram.” 
36 De forma resultante in speculo, 194–195; Liber de sex principiis, II.4, Borgnet I, 325b. 
37 Cf. De sensu et sensato, I.6, 30a. 
38 De forma resultante in speculo, 198–199. Albert was probably not acquainted with the ancient rule of 
localization of mirror images (the image appears to be in the intersection of an extension of the visual ray 
and a line drawn through the object perpendicularly to the surface of the mirror), on which see, e.g., 
Turbayne (1959). 
39 The source of this dubium is most likely Liber sex principiorum (an anonymous twelfth-century treatise on 
the final six categories in Aristotle’s list). See pseudo-Gilbertus Porretanus, Liber sex principiorum, II.19, 
39. Albert refers to this passage already in De forma resultante in speculo, 181–184, 193, and comments on 
the passage in Liber de sex principiis, II.4, Borgnet I, 324b–326a. 
anew successively in a different place in every moment. Although it appears to be in the mirror, 
its cause or “producer” (generans) is the observer playing the role of the reflected object. The 
point where it is generated is determined precisely by the positions of the observer and of the 
object reflected. When the mirror moves, the point of reflection remains stable and hence the 
mirror image does not seem to move. But when the observer moves, the point of reflection is 
adjusted anew in every instance and, consequently, the mirror images seems to move.40 Since 
the continuous generation of mirror images is immensely fast (immediate, actually, as the 
propagation of light takes no time according to Albert), the mirror image appears to the 
observer as if it were in motion.41 
To sum up, Albert can respond to the general objections against the multiplication account 
of mirror images. A mirror image, albeit not identifiable with the object reflected in the mirror, 
is not a stable and fixed quality impressed in the mirror like an ordinary image painted on 
canvas. A mirror image is an entity having a kind of diminished being and resulting from the 
mutual relations between the mirror, the object reflected in it, and the observer. The scenery 
seen in the mirror is reconstituted every time the observer moves. 
Nevertheless, Albert’s account of mirror perception does not fare particularly well in one 
crucial aspect: it is hardly compatible with his general account of perception. Albert embraces 
an Aristotelian theory of perception, modeling vision as a causal process between the visible 
object (the real quality of color) as an active cause and the visual power that passively receives 
the influence of the object. As the object and the eye are not spatially connected, a causal 
intermediary is needed, namely, a species or a form having spiritual or intentional being. The 
object alters first the medium between itself and the observer, and then the observer’s eye, 
creating a similitude or species of itself in the observer’s visual power.42 
Although he rarely specifies his theory in such terms, Albert tends toward a direct realist 
understanding of species. The direct object of perception is the external material thing, not its 
species. The species is rather an instrument, an intermediary transferring information about the 
object or a “principle of cognizing” the object.43 The species mediates cognition but only in so 
far as it functions as an information-transmitter not as a consciously cognized representation. 
In other words, the relation between the cognitive power and the species is causal, not 
cognitive. 
Yet, as Albert mentions, mirror images, like pictures or (mental) representations stored in 
the memory, can be understood in two different ways. On the one hand, grasped in themselves, 
the images function as independent entities catching the observer’s attention. On the other 
hand, however, these images can be grasped as mere representations or signs, as something 
that—although it plays the role of a primary object of cognition—shifts the observer’s attention 
to what it represents, namely the thing reflected, drawn, or remembered.44 Evidently, the ways 
species and (mirror) images function in cognition are different and perhaps incompatible. 
                                                 
40 De forma resultante in speculo, 191–193; Liber de sex principiis, II.4, Borgnet I, 325b–326a. 
41 De homine, 180b. Strictly speaking, the propagation of light is not locomotion (as light is not a body) but an 
instantaneous alteration of the diaphanous medium; see also De anima, II.3.13, 117b–118a. 
42 See, e.g., Steneck (1980), esp. pp. 270–272; on the notion of the spiritual being see Dewan (1980). 
43 De homine, 185a. 
44 De homine, 304b–305a. 
Albert, seemingly unaware that his account of mirror perception is implausible within an 
Aristotelian framework, faces the following dilemma: either abandon the idea that the mirror 
image is a form having spiritual being (i.e. the species) leaving the metaphysical nature of 
mirrors images undecided; or admit that every species can become a primary object of 
perception.45 However, in the latter case it would not be obvious why we are not aware 
primarily of the species in our eyes and only then of the thing that generated the species (just 
as we are primarily aware of a mirror image and only then of the thing reflected). There is no 
indication that Albert recognized the tension in his theory of perception, as expressed in the 
dilemma, or that he attempted to resolve it. 
The Unification Account: Peter Auriol 
Since acknowledging species as direct and primary objects of cognition (i.e. the second horn 
of the dilemma) was not attractive for Albert’s contemporaries (chiefly due to the 
representationalist consequences of such a claim), some thirteenth-century thinkers tended to 
embrace the first horn of the dilemma. They abandoned (Albert’s) intuition that what is seen 
in the mirror is a form and endeavored to think the whole issue through anew. For example, 
adherents of perspectiva (or optics), such as Roger Bacon or John Pecham, calling Albert’s 
position “common” or “vulgar,” asserted that what is seen in the mirror is the material thing 
itself and that the alleged mirror image is nothing more than a mere appearance of the thing 
outside of its place.46 
Indeed, the perspectivists favor a unification account of mirror images (i.e. the mirror image 
is not a really existing entity different from the material object). However, investigating the 
metaphysical nature of mirror images was not among the major objectives of the perspectivist 
inquiry. They focused rather on the issue of determining the location of an image in each of 
the various kinds of mirror using geometry. A genuine interest in the metaphysical dimension 
of mirror images may be found in the philosophy of perception of the early fourteenth-century 
Franciscan thinker Peter Auriol.47 
Peter Auriol was active especially at the Parisian Faculty of Theology in the decade before 
1320; hence, his works are mostly theological in their nature. He wrote a commentary on the 
Sentences (preserved in several versions) and held one Quodlibet.48 His interesting account of 
sensory perception (and theory of cognition generally) is always presented in a broader 
                                                 
45 Admittedly, an acknowledgment of the contrast between the notions of species and image is present is an 
early theological work by Albert. Here he states that whereas the image (idolum) in the eyes (i.e. the species) 
is something “by means of which” (per quod) but not “in which” (in quo) we see the thing, the image 
(idolum) in the mirror is something “in which” (in quo) we see the thing. It may be inferred that, unlike the 
former, the latter case includes a primary grasping of the image itself. See Albert, De resurrectione, IV.1.9.3, 
331a. However, from his De homine onwards, Albert apparently did not employ this neat contrast between 
species and image any more. 
46 See Roger Bacon, Perspectiva, III.1.2, 258; or Pecham, Perspectiva communis, II.19: 168–170. 
47 Auriol was definitely acquainted with perspectivist literature, as suggested already by Tachau (1988: 97–98). 
48 An up-to-date summary of Auriol’s life and works is provided by Wöller (2015: 17–25). 
theological context. Hence, his account of mirror perception is also not introduced in a single 
passage devoted primarily to the topic but dispersed in several places of his Scriptum.49 
A consideration of the nature of mirror images is included in Auriol’s famous list of sensory 
experiences, which has been advocated to justify his conviction about the active nature of 
sensory powers.50 The reason why Auriol includes mirror perception in the list is that such an 
experience (alongside others) reveals the active involvement of the visual power in processing 
visual information and modeling the perceptual content. Therefore, Auriol’s primary objective 
is to deny any account implying the reification of appearances and rendering them as 
independently existing and causally efficacious entities that would on their own elicit visual 
acts in the observer, without the latter’s active involvement in such a process. Thus, the most 
emphasized feature of mirror images is not their causal efficacy, as Albert advocated, but their 
observer dependency. 
Inquiring into the nature of mirror images, Auriol proceeds by eliminating implausible 
opinions.51 First, he focuses on the opinions presupposing that the image is (1) a real entity and, 
consequently, (2) different from the material object itself. It is worth premising that Auriol uses 
a rather broad notion of real being—existing really (or having esse reale), unlike existing 
intentionally (or having esse intentionale), means existing independently of being grasped by 
the cognitive act of a living cognizer.52 Therefore, even species of color abstracted from the 
colored object and existing “spiritually” in a medium, as Albert asserts above, are propagated 
through the medium without the intervention of any cognizer. Therefore, species of colors are 
really existent entities in Auriol’s view.53 
Auriol sketches three different suggestions as to what the mirror image as a real entity may 
amount to. The first option is a version of the multiplication account we encountered in 
Albert—the mirror image is understood as a species, a real (i.e. observation-independent) 
quality existing in the mirror as in its subject.54 However, such an account is not viable 
according to Auriol, since no accident can exceed its subject, but images can sometimes be 
larger than the mirror (when it mirrors a tower or the heavens). As argued above, Albert would 
be able to face this objection: in his view, the species is not an actual accident inhering in the 
whole surface of the mirror, and it has no real dimensions but only represents the dimensions 
                                                 
49 See especially Scriptum I.1.6.4.102, Buytaert I, 366–367; I.3.14.1.31, Buytaert II, 697, and Scriptum 
I.35.2.2, ES, ll. 490–499. Cf. also Davenport (2006: 63–65) and Lička (2017: 116–118). 
50 Scriptum I.3.14.1.31, Buytaert II, 697; for the list see pp. 696–697 and, e.g., Tachau (1988: 90–93). 
51 Auriol’s strategy is obviously inspired by the perpectivists—although Auriol mentions “Perpectivus libro 
IV,” referring to Alhacen (see Alhacen, De aspectibus, IV.4, 37–38), some of his arguments here are very 
similar to the ones proposed by Pecham in the passage referred to in note 48 above. (A possible influence 
of Pecham’s Perspectiva communis in this passage was suggested already by Wood 1982: 223.) 
52 “esse reale et fixum extra in rerum natura absque omni apprehensione”, Scriptum I.23.2.50, De Rijk, 711. 
53 Such a semantic broadening of “real being” is to be dated into the early fourteenth century and relates to a 
shift in understanding intentional being: whereas older authors conceived esse intentionale as the mode of 
being of forms abstracted from matter, some later authors (chiefly those influenced by Scotus) understood it 
as the kind of being an object has in so far as it is cognized. Such a terminological move (and Auriol’s role 
in it) was uncovered already by Tachau (1999). However, her account evinces several minor deficiencies, 
e.g., her reading of Auriol’s notion of intentional being identifies dependency on the cognitive act with 
intramentality—a claim doubted already by Pasnau (1997: 72–73). 
54 Scriptum, I.3.14.1.31, Buytaert II, 697. 
of the object. Nevertheless, Auriol points out another deficiency of the view: if the image were 
a real quality, it would have to penetrate the solid lead substrate of the mirror, since the image 
appears to be beneath the mirror. Auriol seems to be implying that the physical description of 
reflection (i.e. the propagation of the species and their interactions with media and solid 
objects) and the phenomenological description of mirror perception (i.e. what appears to an 
observer), although often confounded in Albert’s account, are to be differentiated. 
Another option is to deny that what is seen is different from the real material object and 
suggest a naive unification view. The mirror image would then be the really existing thing 
itself.55 Although the view tries to preserve the basic unification intuition, that what we see in 
mirrors are the real material objects around us, it has highly implausible consequences when 
the case of self-observation is considered. When someone looks in a mirror, they see their own 
face beneath the mirror. However, it does not make good sense to infer that this face really 
exists beneath the mirror—it only appears to be there. 
It may be added that, if the consequences are fully thought out, insisting on the real being 
of mirror images and reifying these appearances would eventually lead to a bizarre 
multiplication account: the scene seen in the mirror would be an alternative space occupied by 
really existing replicas of the things around us. Speaking about their face seen in the mirror, 
the observer would in fact refer to a face really existing behind the mirror. Further, mirror 
perception would be like a normal visual experience albeit grasping objects from the other side 
of the mirror, and the mirror itself would be a window into another world. 
The last option returns to the claim that the image is different from the object but tries to 
preserve its real being. It points out the “fluid” nature of the mirror image and its partial 
dependency on the observer and proposes reducing it to something in the observer, namely, 
their visual act or an entity existing in their eye: a real quality inhering in their sensory soul.56 
Being identical to the observer’s cognitive act, the mirror image would be both a real entity 
and dependent on observation. Further, the theory would evince the simplicity of the unification 
account, as nothing more than the material object, and the cognizing subject would be included 
in the mirror perception. Nevertheless, this notion does not appeal to Auriol, either. His 
objection refers to the perspectivist practice of investigating the image position in different 
types of mirrors.57 Depending on the type of mirror, the image is formed beneath, on, or in front 
of its surface, always outside the observer and near the mirror. If the mirror image were a mere 
entity in our eyes, we would not perceive it as if it were in the outer environment, Auriol thinks. 
All three options are based on the primary assumption that the mirror images must be entities 
endowed with real being. However, as mentioned above, a property common to entities existing 
realiter is their independence of being observed. Thus, if mirror images were real entities, they 
would exist whether someone was watching or not. Consequently, all appearances would have 
                                                 
55 Scriptum, I.3.14.1.31, Buytaert II, 697. 
56 Scriptum, I.3.14.1.31, Buytaert II, 697. Note that Auriol is not speaking about a mental content of mirror 
perception but only about the respective visual act—roughly, the physical realization of the visual 
experience which is, at least in principle, observable from the third-person perspective. 
57 See the principle mentioned in note 40 above. 
to be reified.58 Yet denying that in some cases our cognitive acts are focused on mere 
appearances without solid ontological foundations (a position Auriol ascribes to some ancient 
relativists criticized by Aristotle in Metaphysics IV) is philosophically problematic. Strictly 
speaking, for all possible appearances, whether veridical or false, there would be a special 
ontologically describable entity, resulting in the coincident real being of mutual 
contradictories.59 
The only possible defense against such an “overpopulation” of reality Auriol proposes is to 
embrace a pluralist conception of being: some entities, such as stones, exist really, i.e. even 
when nobody is looking at them; while other entities, such as rainbows, exist only in a 
diminished, observer-dependent way. Mirror images are examples of the latter—they are mere 
appearances of the things reflected in the mirror or the things themselves in so far as they have 
an “apparent being” (esse apparens) in the mirror.60 
Auriol further asserts that veridical visual acts (even, for that matter, all instances of 
cognition) also grasp the material object only in so far as it appears to them or, in other words, 
are focused on the “apparent being” of their objects. Thus, one and the same object can appear 
differently depending on several conditions (e.g., the quality of illumination, or the sanity of 
the observer’s sensory organs); also, it appears differently to various cognitive powers (e.g., as 
colored to vision, or as universal to the intellect). The mechanism of cognition consists in 
receiving a species of the object and processing it by the respective cognitive power. The result 
is a conscious cognitive (perceptual or conceptual) content (or, putting the cognized thing into 
esse apparens), which is based on the information included in the species. The species then, in 
turn, becomes a cognitive act inhering in the cognitive power, grasping the respective content.61 
Yet Auriol is not completely clear as to what this esse apparens amounts to, and a whole 
generation of Auriol scholars are unable to agree on a single correct interpretation of the 
theory.62 The point of departure usually is the question whether esse apparens is something 
mental or extramental. In fact, textual evidence for both may be derived from Auriol’s works. 
On the one hand, the esse apparens of an object occurs only when it is constituted by a 
cognitive act. Hence, it is mind-dependent and, eo ipso, within the soul.63 On the other hand, 
Auriol stresses that appearances are outside observers in exactly the place where they appear 
to be. Appearances are the things themselves in so far as they appear to us.64 In normal 
                                                 
58 Scriptum, I.3.14.1.31, Buytaert II, 697: “aliqui imaginantur quod imagines sint in speculo [ … ] sive 
videantur sive non videantur, hoc utique falsum est. Tunc enim sequeretur quod haberent verum esse reale.” 
59 Scriptum, I.9.1.1, ES, ll. 312–315: “Et breviter, qui negat quin actus visionis possit ad apparentias terminari, 
cogitur confiteri quod omnia vera sunt quae videntur, contra quos disputat Philosophus, IV Metaphysicae, 
quia contradictoria essent vera, cum uni videatur sic, et alteri aliter.” 
60 Scriptum, I.3.14.1.31, Buytaert II, 697: “Relinquitur igitur quod sit sola apparentia rei vel res habens esse 
apparens et intentionale, ita ut ipsamet res sit infra speculum in esse viso iudicato et apparenti”; see also 
Scriptum, I.1.6.4.102, Buytaert I, 366. 
61 For details of such a reading of Auriol’s cognitive theory, see Lička (2016: 56–69) (here also on Auriol’s 
identification of species with cognitive acts); Lička (2017: 111–115); see also Friedman (2015). 
62 Recently, some interpretations were summarized and assessed by Pasnau (2017): 274–276. 
63 See especially Tachau (1999: 349–350) for this line of reasoning. 
64 Scriptum, I.23.2.55, De Rijk, 712: “rerum apparitiones obiectivas [ … ] sunt realiter eedem cum hiis que 
existunt extra.” 
circumstances, appearances are indistinguishably united (indistinguibiliter adunatum) to the 
things,65 and the observer does not even notice that there is an appearance of the thing created 
by their cognitive activity.66 
This discrepancy could be solved by denying an initial assumption of drawing a sharp 
distinction between the mental realm and the extramental world, one probably inherited from 
modern philosophers whose “corpuscularian physics and … Augustinian psychology pushed 
them toward magnifying the difference between inner and outer” and who, unlike scholastics, 
“want to accentuate the distinction between inner and outer, not conflate it.”67 However, for 
many medieval scholars, and for Auriol especially, there is not the extramental physical world 
on the one hand and the mental realm of conscious subjects governed by different principles 
on the other. Rather, there is an environment exerting causal influences on the cognitive powers 
of living beings such that some potential features of the environment are actualized only 
dependently on the cognitive actions of these cognizers.68 Esse apparens is, then, an apt 
expression of the mutual interdependence of world and cognizers, a property of the really 
existing things which, in turn, evince appearances only in so far as they are cognized. 
The case of mirror images is perfectly illustrative here. A mirror image, as Auriol infers, is 
to be identified with the esse apparens of the appearing thing. The thing appears in the mirror 
with the phenomenal properties it can evince only once it has become the object of a visual 
experience. It is precisely the esse apparens due to which there is more to a mirror image than 
the mere reflections of lines of species of light and color propagating through the medium and 
rebounding from the mirror. Being the esse apparens of the thing reflected in the mirror, the 
mirror image is, on the one hand, external to the mind and localizable (usually) behind the 
mirror. Yet, on the other hand, the image is to some extent an outcome of the cognitive activity 
enabling the object seen to deploy its phenomenal properties. Being observer-dependent, the 
image is also reconstituted as the observer’s position changes. 
Note that Auriol’s account is openly intended as a version of the unification account: what 
is seen in the mirror is the object itself, not an entity different from it. All the talk about its 
“apparent being” is meant as an expression of the dual dependence of mirror appearances on 
both the observer and the object. However, it is not ontologically committing: esse apparens 
does not have enough reality to be a full-fledged entity.69 Therefore, Auriol’s account provides 
an intuitive and elegant solution to the conundrum concerning the image movements. While 
                                                 
65 Scriptum, I.27.2.2, ES, ll. 583–598. 
66 Scriptum, I.3.14.1.31, Buytaert II, 698: “non distinguitur imago seu res in esse apparenti ab esse reali, quia 
simul coincidunt in vera visione.” 
67 Pasnau (2017: 277). 
68 Take the example of universals or relations: Auriol, as a conceptualist, believes that only individual things 
exist really in the world; yet they have the potentiality to appear as universal or related to other things when 
appropriately grasped by an intellect. The intellect then has the power to actualize these potentialities and 
fulfil or complete the being of universals or relations. Scholastics owe this doctrine of the intellect as 
“completer” of reality to Averroes; see Kobusch (2009: 253–255). 
69 Auriol points out that esse apparens is “nothing in itself” and must be reduced to something real, namely, the 
cognitive act. See Scriptum, I.9.1.1, ES, ll. 364–369; Quodlibeta sexdecim 8.1, fol. 81bC, and Friedman 
(2015: 144–145, 151). In Scriptum, I.9.1.1, ES, ll. 513–518, Auriol even says that esse apparens is merely 
metaphorical (nihil est in se nisi deminute et metaphorice). 
Albert had to propose a complete physical recasting of all the species involved in mirror 
perception with each movement of the object, Auriol can solve the problem by saying that what 
is seen in the mirror is always the object. Since it is not a form in the mirror (and, thus, not a 
property of the mirror), its movements depend on the movements of the object and not on the 
mirror—they are the movements of the object itself in so far as appearing in the mirror. 
A further merit of Auriol’s account is that his explanation of mirror images is, unlike 
Albert’s, coherent within his general theory of sensory perception, proving that there is an 
appearance of the thing involved in every perceptual act (albeit indistinguishable in veridical 
perception). 
Nevertheless, Auriol’s account cannot evade criticism. Earlier authors and especially Albert 
had emphasized the pivotal problem of every unification account. If we held that what is seen 
in the mirror is the real object itself and there is no real entity in the mirror, then every instance 
of mirror perception would be utterly deceptive. For “uneducated people who follow the 
judgment of sense rather than of reason,” as Albert the Great states, speaking about an image 
in the mirror is an “irresistible error,” since their “sight announces to them that there is an image 
in the mirror.”70 In other words, the unification account conflicts with common notions of 
mirror perception, which are saved only by accepting the multiplication account. 
Was Auriol willing to admit that every mirror perception is illusory in a radical sense? He 
included the mirror example in his famous list of experiences which is often read as a list of 
visual illusions.71 Further, in one place Auriol mentions that when a thing is seen by a direct 
line and without any error, its apparent and real being coincide, whereas when it is seen by a 
reflected or refracted line, the appearance “stands apart” from the actual place of the object 
seen, implying that the latter case is illusory.72 But the claim that mirror perception is illusory 
is rather counterintuitive as people use mirrors as useful instruments every day, providing 
further support for a multiplication theory. 
Auriol seems to both hold that mirror perception is not illusory in a strict sense and preserve 
his unificationist account. The alleged delusiveness of mirror perception is relativized by 
advocating its practical usefulness. Take the example of seeing one’s own face in the mirror. 
Even if the face appearing in the mirror were a real entity distinct from the real face (which is 
not the case, as the image exists in the mirror only apparently), or, in other words, if the 
multiplication account were right, it would not imply that the actual face would be seen to a 
lesser extent. For Auriol, this is justified by practical consequences: the observer would be able 
to act upon their own face by virtue of its mirror image: touch it, make it up, clean a stain on 
it, although their eyes would be primarily focused on the mirror image of the face. The 
                                                 
70 Albert, Liber de sex principiis, II.4, Borgnet I, 325a: “Si autem dicatur in speculo non esse imago, quamvis 
hoc aliquo modo verum sit, tamen apud imperitum vulgus, quod judicium sensus sequitur potius quam 
rationem, erit hic error intolerabilis, quia visus nuntiat imaginem esse in speculo.” See also De sensu et 
sensato, I.9, 39a–b and pseudo-Gilbertus Porretanus, Liber de sex principiis, II.19, 39 who speaks about an 
“incredible error.” 
71 See, e.g., Wood (1982: 220–223). 
72 Quodlibeta sexdecim, 8.3, f. 87bE. 
possibility of discerning the face with all its features would be equally good as if the real face 
were behind the mirror.73 
Furthermore, the observer is not deceived if the unification account holds—they see the 
reflected thing itself. Hence, our practical ability to make use of mirrors reveals that mirror 
perception is not always deceptive. When the observer is speaking about what they see in the 
mirror, a considerable number of their statements are true propositions, since they are speaking 
about the real objects themselves. Whereas the information about the object’s color, look, 
shape, parts, etc., available to the observer in mirror perception is roughly the same as in direct 
vision, only the information about the object’s position and its right–left orientation presented 
to the senses seems distorted. 
Hence, although Auriol admits mirror perception is not as accurate as normal veridical 
vision,74 it is not illusory in general.75 In my opinion, Auriol would suggest that mirrors (at 
least, everyday plane mirrors) do not deliver perfect and completely veridical perceptual 
information to us; nevertheless, they do not force us to hold false beliefs. In other words, we 
get used to handling mirrors: we are aware of the mirror as such and prepared for the fact that 
some properties of the thing seen are not presented to us with complete accuracy. We are not 
fooled by mirrors when we are aware of them, and, as some contemporary philosophers say, 
we are usually not epistemically innocent in mirror perception.76 Since mirrors intervene in the 
perceptual process only in a systematic and thus predictable way, we are entitled to say that 
they do not deceive us and that mirror perception is not illusory in the strict sense. 
Auriol’s other strategy against the alleged global delusiveness of mirror perception is the 
emphasis he puts on the claim that what is seen in the mirror (the mirror image or the thing in 
esse apparens) is the very real object itself. He is convinced that when we speak about what 
we see in the mirror, we are talking about the object itself and not about a kind of entity different 
from the object and somehow present in the mirror.77 
                                                 
73 Scriptum, I.35.2.2, ES, ll. 492–499. In that place, Auriol makes a concession to the multiplicationist view 
only in order to illustrate the theological claim that God cognizes primarily his essence and, by means of 
that, secondarily but equally perfectly his creation. Emphasizing that in the case of God, cognizing x by 
means of grasping something different realiter does not mean that the former is cognized less perfectly, 
Auriol alludes to the case of mirror perception but reshapes it as if the mirror image were a real entity to 
make it analogous to the case of God. 
74 Scriptum, I.9.1, ES, ll. 299–300. 
75 The argument that he includes mirror perception in his famous list is not decisive: the list is not intended 
primarily as a list of illusions but as a group of visual experiences revealing the active nature of the senses in 
perception. 
76 Casati (2012: 197–200); Steenhagen (2017: 1229–1230, 1239–1241). Note that Auriol was prepared to 
account for our awareness of the mirror in mirror perception. He stresses that mirror perception is a more 
complex instance of cognition than a normal one, since there are two visual acts in our eyes 
simultaneously—both the species of the mirror and the species reflected by the mirror are received and 
processed at the same time. See Scriptum, I.35.2.1, ES, ll. 305–309; Quodlibeta sexdecim, 10.4, f. 106bC. 
77 It may be objected that Auriol uses the notion of mirror image too often, which opens the door for the 
multiplicationist view; however, he stresses that imago is a technical term borrowed from the perspectivist 
tradition that signifies nothing but the thing itself as appearing in the mirror—see Scriptum, I.27.2.3, ES, ll. 
1100–1103. 
A fictional scenario by Auriol supports this unificationist intuition based on common 
descriptions of mirror images. Imagine there are two kinds of eyes. The first kind of eyes can 
gaze at nothing but mirror images conceived in a multiplicationist way, where the mirror image 
is different from the objects reflected but the observer cognizes the thing through its image 
(even, for that matter, equally well). The second kind of eyes always sees things in themselves, 
unmediated by any representation. Although both kinds of eyes may cognize the thing equally 
well, it would be counterintuitive, in Auriol’s view, to say that the first kind has the things 
themselves as the object of vision.78 If the multiplication account held, then observers would 
commonly talk primarily about the images and the things reflected only derivatively. Since it 
is more common to talk about the things themselves, mirror perception is more like normal 
direct perception than multiplicationist mediated perception in Auriol’s view, unification 
accords better with our common intuitions and mirror perception (like the direct one) belongs 
to the second kind of eyes in Auriol’s fictive scenario. 
There is also a phenomenological justification for the claim that a mirror image is the thing 
itself. When sight is gazing at a mirror image, visual attention (intuitus visionis) is fixed upon 
it; it does not extend behind the image or bounce from it toward the thing.79 Auriol is convinced 
that if mirror images were mere representations, seeing them would shift the direction of our 
attention somehow and would not leave us unaware of such a shifting.80 
However, Auriol’s unificationist claim is also problematic for seemingly asserting that the 
real object and its image in the mirror are identical. But identity presupposes 
indistinguishability; which, apparently, is not the case: the positions of the real thing and its 
image are distinguishable and, thus, the two items are different. However, on a closer look, this 
objection is based on a misunderstanding of Auriol’s theory. What it asserts is that a real object 
and its mirror image are distinguishable based on their different positions, but distinguishing 
A from B presupposes (1) cognitively grasping A and B independently of each other and (2) 
comparing A and B with regard to a certain feature. However, in the case of mirror perception, 
the real object and its image are not grasped independently. To grasp the real object “as it is,” 
i.e. without its esse apparens (the mirror image), simply does not make good sense in Auriol’s 
theory since every cognitive grasping necessarily involves posing the thing grasped into esse 
apparens.81 As (1) the real object and its appearance are not grasped separately, (2) the two 
cannot be compared in a single act of mirror perception. 
                                                 
78 Scriptum, I.35.2.4, ES, ll. 1167–1172: “Certum est enim quod, si poneretur duplex genus oculi—unum 
quidem quod non posset nisi imagines in speculo contueri, et per hoc omnia quorum essent illae imagines 
aequipollenter cognoscere diceretur [ … ]; alterum vero quod ipsas res aspiceret in se ipsis—si sic utique 
poneretur, nullus <diceret quod primus oculus, qui> [ … ] imagines cerneret, haberet pro obiecto res ipsas, 
sed potius aliquid aequipollens” (Emendation by editor). 
79 Scriptum, I.1.6.4.102, Buytaert I, 367: “Quod enim imago quae apparet in speculo sit res quae videtur, claret 
ex hoc quod intuitus visionis terminatur ad illam imaginem ultimate, nec reflectitur ab illa super rem.” See 
also Scriptum, I.35.2.2, ES, ll. 545–548. 
80 Such a conception of mirrors as attention-switchers is elaborated by Auriol’s earlier confrère, Peter Olivi; 
see Lička (2017: 108–110). 
81 See Tachau (1988: 94). After all, to cognize x is defined as posing x in esse apparens by Auriol; see 
Friedman (2015: 145–150); Lička (2016: 56, 61–62), and Pasnau (2017: 274). 
In fact, the objection is not about comparing the real object and an apparent one in the same 
instance of perception but about comparing the objects (or, rather, the contents) of two different 
perceptual acts, namely, direct perception and mirror perception. Indeed, the object as 
appearing in direct perception and the object as appearing in mirror perception are 
distinguishable regarding their (apparent) positions. In the latter case, a mirror intervenes in the 
perceptual process and distorts the causal process of information transmission, the result being 
that the object appears to be somewhere other than it is. (Similarly, when we look at a thing 
with a magnifying glass, the image of the thing, or the thing as appearing due to the magnifier, 
is bigger than the same thing perceived directly.) 
In other words, the two instances of esse apparens (albeit of the same object) are 
distinguishable (and thus different), which is not surprising since the causal processes 
generating them are different. Nevertheless, this does not imply at all that the esse apparens 
and its real object included in a single act of vision are distinguishable (and hence non-
identical). 
After all, this is the point Auriol himself stresses: when gazing at a mirror image, the 
observer encounters two items: the thing that appears and the appearance by means of which it 
appears. However, his perceptual content is not structured—the observer is not aware of what 
is from the thing and what is somehow added to the thing (and, definitely, something is added, 
allowing, for example, multiplied images in some kinds of mirrors, although the thing reflected 
remains single). On the contrary, the observer sees the whole thing and the whole appearance 
indistinguishably, as something simple.82 
The question remains: why does the mirror image appear to be located behind the mirror? 
Why does it not appear to be co-located with the real object? Auriol does not address the issue 
explicitly. However, he seems to imply that it is an outcome of the following two facts. First, 
mirrors are specific kind of media and are thus included in the process of cognitive information 
transmission, but they mediate information about a different part of the environment than the 
observer would expect. In other words, they change the direction of the propagation of species 
from the object to the observer’s eye.83 Second, it is a general phenomenological fact that 
everything seen is seen directly, as if located on a straight line directed from the eye.84 Auriol 
acknowledges the fact and even puts a special emphasis on it. Unlike Albert, he defines sensory 
powers not by their proper object but by their own “mode of appearing” (modus apparendi), 
i.e. the way the objects grasped by a certain power appear to it. The essential feature of the 
                                                 
82 Scriptum, I.1.6.4.102, Buytaert I, 366–367: “In imagine [ … ] existente in speculo [ … ] in esse apparenti [ 
… ] et est res quae apparet et apparitio qua apparet, et tamen totum videtur apparitio et totum videtur res. 
Non enim intellectus distinguit imaginem in id quod est in ea de re, et in id quod est quasi additum illi rei, 
quia imago videtur sola res, et imago etiam videtur sola apparitio rei. [ … ] Quod autem imago illa includat 
aliquid ultra rem patet, quoniam imagines multiplicari possunt, eadem re inmultiplicata. Res igitur, ut 
apparens [ … ] videtur includere aliqua, puta rem et apparitionem, quae quidem videntur eadem per 
omnimodam indistinctionem [ … ] ut quid simplex.” 
83 Scriptum, I.35.2.1, ES, ll. 336–337; Quodlibeta sexdecim, 10.4, f. 106bC. 
84 Such an a-priori feature of vision was emphasized already by ancient optics, see especially Simon (1987: 
319–321) and Smith (2015: 92–93). 
senses (and of sight in particular) is that objects appears to them as spatially localized by an 
imaginary straight line drawn from the eye.85 
With these two facts in mind, Auriol can explain mirror perception in the following way. 
When a species of the object reflected from the mirror enters the eye, it is processed by the 
observer’s visual power. However, as sight is unable to account for the mirror’s intervention 
in the propagation of species, it works as usual and generates the esse apparens (according to 
the information in the species) somewhere in the direction from which the species came. Hence, 
the object seen in the mirror seems to be on the prolongation of an imaginary straight line 
drawn from the eye outwards. 
To sum up, Auriol is able to substantially weaken the objections against his unification 
account of mirror images: mirror perception is not universally illusory as the images seen in 
mirrors are the material objects themselves, with the further advantage over Albert’s account 
that his explanation of mirror perception is compatible with his general theory of perception. 
Conclusion 
As a recent paper says, the worth of philosophical catoptrics (the philosophical study of special 
instances of perceptual experience involving mirrors) consists in that it “enables us to recast 
familiar issues in the philosophy of perception.”86 The present chapter aimed to demonstrate 
that some issues included in this intellectual inquiry were anticipated by medieval philosophers. 
Neither of the two medieval stances on this issue introduced here went beyond the rudimental 
intuition that what is grasped by perception is an object and, consequently, what is seen in the 
mirror is also a kind of object. However, Albert the Great and Peter Auriol elaborated on this 
initial intuition in different ways. Albert stresses the (alleged) causal efficacy of the mirror 
image: it acts on the observer’s eye; thus, it is a real entity. For Albert, these images are 
accidental forms, namely, qualities like colors, or rather species of colors existing in a special 
“spiritual” way, that enables them not to change the material structure of the mirror and make 
it colored. On the contrary, Auriol puts more stress on the observer dependency of these mirror 
images, a consequence being that what is seen in the mirror is the actual material object itself, 
albeit appearing behind the mirror. Explaining what it means “to appear,” Auriol postulates a 
special ontological layer of appearances that is dependent both on the real objects and on 
observers but not reducible to either of these. 
Albert’s multiplicationist attitude is more “metaphysical”: the appearance is reified and 
understood as a categorizable entity. The mirror image is something almost physical: it is an 
outcome of the physical process of light propagation and color abstraction in which the mirror 
has intervened. By contrast, Auriol embraces a more “phenomenological” attitude: as a 
unificationist, he cannot rely on a special entity in the mirror playing the role of the content of 
mirror perception. What is seen in the mirror is the object itself. However, as every object of 
perception, it is grasped only in so far as it is appearing—and, in this situation, the appearance 
of the object is behind the mirror. 
                                                 
85 Scriptum, I.prooem.2.119, Buytaert I, 208; Scriptum, I.35.1.1, ES, ll. 385–388; see also Lička (2016: 53–54). 
86 Steenhagen (2017: 1242). 
Auriol is also more cautious than Albert in delineating between the physical description of 
the propagation of species and their reflection from the mirror on the one hand and the 
phenomenological description of the appearances seen in the mirror as partially resulting from 
the observer’s own perceptual activity on the other. These two perspectives are confounded in 
Albert’s theory: the mirror image is a species in the mirror playing the role of both the causal 
vehicle of mirror perception and its content. Consequently, a discrepancy sneaks into Albert’s 
account of vision: species, usually casted as mere causal intermediaries in the visual process, 
suddenly become the true object of perception. 
While Albert’s explanation of mirror perception is weakened by being incoherent with his 
general visual theory, Auriol’s theory perhaps pays too much for its compatibility with the rest 
of his theory of perception. It includes several perplexing claims, for example, “Auriol owes 
us an explanation for how” a cognitive act “can help us put the extramental object itself into a 
different type of being.”87 Would he really subscribe to the idea that our cognitive activity 
somehow completes reality? Is it really plausible to read his theory of cognitive activity, which 
although performed within us has important results outside in the environment, as defying the 
boundary between mind and world, so self-evident for us? The medieval accounts of some 
perceptual ephemera place us before freshly conveyed but traditional philosophical questions. 
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